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Abstract
Binary code authorship identification determines authors of
a binary program. Existing techniques have used supervised
machine learning for this task. In this paper, we look at this
problem from an attacker’s perspective. We aim to modify
a test binary, such that it not only causes misprediction but
also maintains the functionality of the original input binary.
Attacks against binary code are intrinsically more difficult
than attacks against domains such as computer vision, where
attackers can change each pixel of the input image indepen-
dently and still maintain a valid image. For binary code, even
flipping one bit of a binary may cause the binary to be in-
valid, to crash at the run-time, or to lose the original func-
tionality.
We investigate two types of attacks: untargeted attacks,
causing misprediction to any of the incorrect authors, and tar-
geted attacks, causing misprediction to a specific one among
the incorrect authors. We develop two key attack capabil-
ities: feature vector modification, generating an adversar-
ial feature vector that both corresponds to a real binary and
causes the required misprediction, and input binary modifi-
cation, modifying the input binary to match the adversarial
feature vector while maintaining the functionality of the in-
put binary.
We evaluated our attack against classifiers trained with a
state-of-the-art method for authorship attribution. The clas-
sifiers for authorship identification have 91% accuracy on
average. Our untargeted attack has a 96% success rate on
average, showing that we can effectively suppress author-
ship signal. Our targeted attack has a 46% success rate on
average, showing that it is possible, but significantly more
difficult to impersonate a specific programmer’s style. Our
attack reveals that existing binary code authorship identifica-
tion techniques rely on code features that are easy to modify,
and thus are vulnerable to attacks.
1 Introduction
The task of binary code authorship attribution is to determine
the authors of a binary program, and has significant applica-
tion to malware forensics, software supply chain risk man-
agement, and software plagiarism detection. Recent studies
[1, 6, 17, 18, 25] have made significant progress in develop-
ing machine learning based techniques to identify authors of
binary programs. In this paper, we look at the problem of
authorship identification from an attacker’s perspective and
attempt to perform authorship evasion, whose goal is to trick
machine learning classifiers for authorship identification into
making wrong predictions. We show that adversarial ma-
chine learning can pose a threat to binary code authorship
identification when confronted with a carefully crafted bi-
nary code artifact, causing these classifiers to produce mis-
leading results.
Authorship evasion is the application of adversarial ma-
chine learning to authorship identification. The field of ad-
versarial machine learning has focused on attacking and de-
fending machine learning systems used in real world applica-
tions [4]. A specific threat is called a test time attack, where
attackers change a test example to cause misprediction. Re-
searchers have performed successful test time attacks for a
wide range of domains, including computer vision [2, 7, 27],
audio processing [36], and program analysis tasks [8, 26].
Such test time attacks can have serious security implica-
tions. For example, Grosse et al. [8] showed that they can
change the manifest file of an Android program to circum-
vent malware detection; and Simko et al. [26] showed that
when given source code from other people, a programmer
can change the source code to avoid authorship attribution.
However, currently there are no such attacks against bi-
nary code authorship identification. The key challenge for
developing such attacks is to modify the binary to not only
cause misprediction, but also maintain the structural validity
and functionality of the binary. Even flipping one bit of a
binary may cause the binary to either be invalid, such as not
loadable by the loader, or lose functionality that the attackers
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care about. Therefore, attacks against binary code are intrin-
sically more difficult than attacks targeted at domains such
as computer vision, where attackers can change each pixel
of the input image independently and still maintain a valid
image.
In this paper, we present a framework for automatically at-
tacking techniques for binary code authorship identification.
The contributions of our attack framework are three-fold.
1. We show that it is realistic to automatically attack bi-
nary in an end-to-end fashion: we take a binary program
as input and generate a new, valid binary that has the
same functionality as the input binary and causes mis-
prediction. We believe that our attack framework can
be used for attacking other binary code forensic tasks,
such as malware detection and compiler identification.
2. Our techniques can be used for adversarial re-training
to train more secure classifiers, incorporating the gener-
ated adversarial examples into the training set to re-train
a classifier with a modified loss function [14, 19].
3. We reveal the weaknesses of a state-of-the-art technique
for binary code authorship identification [6] and sum-
marize the lessons we learned for designing more se-
cure machine learning systems for binary analysis tasks.
We stress that it is important to assess learning based
techniques from the attacker’s perspective.
We focus on two different types of attacks: the untargeted
attack, which is to cause misprediction to any of the incorrect
authors; and the targeted attack, which is to cause mispredic-
tion to a specific incorrect author.
Stealthiness is an important design goal of our attack. Our
attack should not leave obvious footprints that can be easily
detected. We aim to improve stealthiness in two dimensions.
First, the generated adversarial binary should be similar to
the original binary in structure. We prefer small and local
modifications over large and global modifications. Second,
our attack should be diversified, meaning when running mul-
tiple times with the same input, our attack should generate
different adversarial binaries. Diversified attacks make hash-
based detection strategies ineffective.
We make two main assumptions about the threat model.
First, the attackers have perfect knowledge of target author-
ship identification tool. This assumption allows performing
a worst-case evaluation of the security of the target author-
ship identification tool, common when performing test time
attacks [2, 7, 26, 27]. Second, the attackers plan to perform
a test time attack, so they can affect the prediction results
only by providing a crafted input binary. Other possible at-
tacks against learning systems such as training set poisoning
[3, 16] are not in the scope of this paper.
Authorship identification techniques have a training stage
and a testing stage. While we do not directly attack the
training stage, three choices made in this stage impact our
attacks. First, the design of the binary code features deter-
mines the program properties of the binary to modify during
attacks. Features are typically defined to describe program
properties including machine instructions, program control
flow, constant strings, and program meta-data such as func-
tion symbols. Second, identification techniques use binary
code analysis tools such as Dyninst [22], NDISASM [28] or
Radare2 [20] for feature extraction. A key part of our attack
is to modify the binary and trick the binary code analysis
tools into extracting modified features to cause mispredic-
tion. Third, based on the machine learning algorithm used by
the identification technique, the attacker may need to use dif-
ferent attack algorithms to determine which features should
be modified to cause misprediction. There are existing attack
algorithms for a variety of learning models, including Deep
Neural Networks (DNNs) [7], Random Forests (RFs) [12],
and Support Vector Machines (SVMs)[2, 8].
Our attack ties closely to the testing stage. Figure 1 illus-
trates the testing stage and the key steps of our attack. The
testing stage has two key steps: extracting code features from
the input binary to construct a feature vector and applying the
pre-trained model on the feature vector to generate the pre-
diction results. Our new attack focuses on developing two
interacting attacking abilities: feature vector modification,
generating an adversarial feature vector that corresponds to
a real binary and causes the required misprediction, and input
binary modification, modifying the input binary to match the
adversarial feature vector while maintaining the functional-
ity of the input binary.
Our attack framework introduces a large space for gen-
erating diversified attacks. Given an input binary and the
misprediction target, feature vector modification can gener-
ate different adversarial feature vectors to cause the required
misprediction. Given an adversarial feature vector, input bi-
nary modification can generate different adversarial binaries
to match the feature vector.
Our basic idea of feature vector modification is to integrate
multiple modification strategies to increase the chance of
finding the desired feature vector and to generate diversified
feature vectors. Candidate strategies include random feature
modification, the attack presented by Carlini and Wagner [7]
(denoted as the CW attack), and the projected gradient de-
scent (PGD) [10]. We extend these modification strategies
in two ways to address the structural validity requirement of
binary programs:
First, existing attacks modified each feature indepen-
dently; changing one pixel of an image does not impact other
pixels. However, features in our domain can be correlated.
Without considering feature correlation, we may generate
feature vectors for which there do not exist corresponding
valid binaries.
We perform a feature correlation analysis to derive feature
correlation from a substitute data set. Note that this data set
can be, but does not have to be the training set used for train-
ing the target classifier. We can derive useful feature corre-
lation information, as long as this data set is drawn from the
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Figure 1: Overview of our attack. Our attack includes two key steps. Feature vector modification generates an adversarial
feature vector that corresponds to a real binary and causes the required misprediction. Input binary modification generates a
new binary that matches the generated adversarial feature vector. The dashed blue box illustrates the testing stage of binary
code authorship identification. A blue arrow represents a step from the testing stage. An orange arrow represents a step of our
attack.
same application domain as the training set. We then use the
correlation information to ensure that correlated features are
modified in a consistent way.
Second, existing attacks did not consider the difficulty
of modifying a feature; changing any pixel of an image is
equally easy for maintaining the validity of the image. How-
ever, for binary analysis, some features are easier to modify
than others. For example, local features that describe ma-
chine instructions are typically easier to modify than global
features that describe program control flow, because modify-
ing global features can require changing more code, making
it more difficult to maintain structural validity.
We categorize binary code features into a small number
of feature groups such that features in a group can be mod-
ified with the same strategy. We attempt to modify one fea-
ture group at a time until causing misprediction. Grouping
features also allows generating diversified adversarial fea-
ture vectors by modifying different combinations of feature
groups.
Our input binary modification removes or injects features
according to the results of feature vector modification, with
the additional goals of maintaining structural validity and
preserving functionality. To remove features, we need to
ensure that the program properties that correspond to the
removed feature are replaced with semantically equivalent
ones. In many cases, we cannot simply remove them because
such modification would break the functionality of the bi-
nary. On the other hand, the main challenge of injecting fea-
tures is to ensure that the binary code analysis tools used for
feature extraction indeed recognize the injected code, data or
meta-data.
We observe that the space of binary modification is large
and there could be many different binaries matching the
given adversarial feature vector. Therefore, we show the fea-
sibility of our attack by construction. We design injection
and removal strategies for each feature group. These modifi-
cation strategies consist of a sequence of binary modification
primitives, including inserting, deleting, and replacing code,
data, and meta-data. Our modification primitives use ran-
domization, thus add another dimension to the diversity of
our attack. Binary instrumentation and rewriting tools such
as Dyninst support the implementation of these modification
primitives.
We evaluate our evasion attacks using five classifiers
trained with the techniques presented by Caliskan-Islam et
al. [6]. We achieved 96% success rate for untargeted at-
tacks and 46% success rate for targeted attacks. Our results
show that we can effectively suppress authorship signal for
authorship evasion, but it is significantly more difficult to im-
personate the style of another author. Our results also reveal
the weakness in current authorship identification techniques.
Many features used in current authorship identification tech-
niques are based on program properties that are easy to ma-
nipulate. We can automatically modify these features, mak-
ing such classifiers vulnerable to test time attacks.
3
2 An Attack Example
We present an example showing how to perform untargeted
attacks to a classifier for binary code authorship attribution.
The goal of this section is to give an overview of our attack
process. In the subsequence sections, we describe the steps
in more details.
We first describe the procedures for setting up the target
classifier, which is trained with the techniques presented by
Caliskan-Islam et al. [6]. We then describe how to gener-
ate feature vectors that correspond to real binaries and cause
misprediction. Finally, we give examples on how to modify
the binary to match the generated feature vectors.
2.1 Binary Code Authorship Attribution
Caliskan-Islam et al. [6] assume that a binary is written by a
single author, so, they predict one author for a binary. Their
workflow can be summarized in four steps.
1. Define candidate features: They used binary code fea-
tures that describe machine instructions and program
control flow. They also included source code features
derived from decompiled source code. The source code
features include character n-grams and tree n-grams.
The tree n-grams are extracted from abstract syntax
trees (ASTs) built by parsing the source code. These
source code features have been shown to be effective
for source code authorship attribution [5].
2. Extract features: They used two disassemblers, NDIS-
ASM [28] and radare2 [20], to extract binary code fea-
tures. To derive source code features, they first used
the Hex-Ray decompiler [9], and then used Joern [35]
to parse the source code into ASTs. They represent
each feature as a string. To derive feature strings, they
first split the results of disassembly, decompiling, and
source code parsing into tokens and then normalize hex
tokens to the generic symbol “hexdecimal” and deci-
mal digit tokens to the generic symbol “number”. They
use string matching to count the frequency of a feature
string and use the frequencies of feature strings to con-
struct feature vectors.
3. Select Features: Typically, hundreds of thousands of
features are extracted from a data set. So, feature se-
lection is necessary to avoid overfitting. They selected
features that have information gain with respect to the
author labels.
4. Train a classifier: They compared Random Forests
(RFs) with Support Vector Machines (SVMs) and re-
ported that RFs outperformed SVMs.
They used a data set derived from Google Code Jam (GCJ)
and evaluated their techniques with binaries compiled by
GCC on a 32-bit platform. For binaries compiled with GCC
and -O0, they achieved 96% accuracy for classifying 100 au-
thors. For binaries compiled with higher optimization levels,
they reported slightly lower accuracy.
We obtained the GCJ source files used by Caliskan-Islam
et al. [6] and their source code for extracting features. Due
to the predominance of 64-bit platforms, we perform attacks
on 64-bit platforms. Note that while Caliskan-Islam et al.
only evaluated their techniques on 32-bit platforms, their
techniques can be directly applied to 64-bit platforms. We
compiled the GCJ sources with GCC 5.4.0, using -O0 opti-
mization on a 64-bit platform, and achieved 90% accuracy
for classifying 30 authors.
2.2 Feature Vector Modification
Given the target classifier to attack, the goal of our attack is
to modify an input binary to cause the required mispredic-
tion. The two key steps for attacking this authorship attribu-
tion classifier are generating feature vectors that can corre-
spond to a real binary and cause the required misprediction,
and modifying the input binary to match the feature vector.
We use examples to illustrate the importance of our feature
correlation analysis and feature grouping on generating an
adversarial feature vector.
2.2.1 Feature Correlation Analysis
We derive correlations between features to guide feature vec-
tor modification to generate feature vectors corresponding to
real binaries.
We identify two types of feature correlation for this clas-
sifier. First, a feature can contain other features. For ex-
ample, if feature “push rax; push rbx” is present in a bi-
nary, features “push rax” and “push rbx” are also present.
So, the frequencies of “push rax” and “push rbx” should
be no fewer than the frequency of “push rax; push rbx”.
Second, the same properties extracted by different binary
analysis tools are treated as different features. For exam-
ple, the instruction “call fprintf” corresponds to three dif-
ferent features: “call fprintf” extracted by NDISASM,
“call fprintf” extracted by radare2, and “fprintf” ex-
tracted from decompiled source code. These features should
all have the same frequency.
We derive linear correlation between features based on the
training set. For each pair of features, we perform linear re-
gression and calculate the correlation coefficient. If the coef-
ficient is larger than a threshold value, such as 0.9, we merge
the pair into one feature. While this simple strategy will miss
non-linear feature correlation, our experiments showed that
capturing linear correlation is sufficient for launching suc-
cessful attacks against authorship attribution.
2.2.2 Generating Adversarial Feature Vectors
Our framework supports multiple feature vector modification
strategies, including random modification, the attack pre-
sented by Carlini and Wagner [7] (denoted as the CW attack),
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and the projected gradient descent (PGD). We use the CW
attack in this example as it out-performs other attacks in our
experiments. The CW attack is designed for DNNs trained
for images, and can be readily applied to other gradient based
learning algorithms. However, Caliskan-Islam et al. used
RFs, which is a non-gradient based learning algorithm. For-
tunately, researchers have shown that adversarial examples
created for classifiers trained with one type of learning algo-
rithms (such as DNN) are likely to cause misprediction for
classifier trained with a different type of learning algorithms
(such as RF) [21, 30]. Therefore, we first trained a substitute
DNN using the same training data and then applied the ad-
versarial vectors to the RF classifier. The substitute DNN is
a simple feed-forward neural network, containing 7 hidden
layers with each layer having 50 hidden units. The substi-
tute DNN has 80% accuracy. While the substitute DNN has
modestly lower accuracy than the target classifier, as we will
show in Section 4, this accuracy gap does not impact the suc-
cess rate of our attack.
To ensure that the generated adversarial feature vector
confuses not only the substitute classifier but also the target
classifier, we keep generating new feature vectors until the
resulting vectors can mislead the target classifier. Our new
attack strategy can generate effective adversarial feature vec-
tors, reducing the accuracy of both the substitute DNN and
the RF classifier to 0%.
However, it is difficult to modify the input binary to com-
pletely match the feature vectors generated in this way, as
they contain hundreds of modified features.
2.2.3 Categorizing Features
We have observed that while the attacks presented by Car-
lini and Wagner can make effective changes to the feature
vector to cause misprediction, not all changes are necessary
for causing misprediction. Therefore, we attempt to mod-
ify fewer features to cause misprediction, making it easier to
perform binary modification to match the generated feature
vector. We categorize features into feature groups, so that
features in the same feature group can be modified with the
same strategy. And then we modify one feature group at a
time until misprediction occurs.
Two important factors for categorizing the features are the
program properties that the features describe and the strength
of the binary analysis tools. For the first factor, features de-
scribing low level code properties such as machine instruc-
tions are easier to modify compared to features describing
higher level structural properties such as program control
flow and data flow. Therefore, we started by attacking in-
struction features.
For the second factor, recall that Caliskan-Islam et al.
used two disassemblers: NDISASM, which disassembles the
binary linearly from the first byte of the binary file, and
radare2, which understands the layout of the binary, per-
Feature string or [rax],ebp
Raw bytes 09 28
Modification Insert bytes 09 28 into a new non-
loadable section
Figure 2: An example of injecting a NDISASM feature. We can
insert the bytes into a non-loadable section.
forms binary analysis to identify code bytes, and attempts
to disassemble only code bytes. It is easier to modify fea-
tures extracted by NDISASM, because NDISASM also dis-
assembles non-loadable sections and editing or adding non-
loadable sections has no impact on the functionality of the
program. On the other hand, instruction features extracted
by radare2 typically represent real code. So, we need to en-
sure that we do not change the functionality when removing
a radare2 feature, and ensure that radare2 disassembles the
inserted code when injecting a radare2 feature.
After grouping features, we first modify instruction fea-
tures extracted by NDISASM, reducing the accuracy from
90% to 45%. We then modify instruction features extracted
by radare2, further reducing the accuracy from 45% to 7%.
Note that only features in the these two feature groups are
modified and we can generate new binaries to complete the
attack.
2.3 Binary Modification Strategies
Finally, we describe our binary modification strategies for in-
jecting and removing NDISASM and radare2 features, using
four typical examples. These examples are extracted from
our successful attacks. In each example, we describe the
modification primitives that constitute the modification strat-
egy and explain why our modifications do not change the
functionality of the input binary.
2.3.1 Modifying NDISASM Features
We show two examples of modifying NDISASM features.
The first example shows the case where we can inject a fea-
ture by inserting bytes into the binary. As shown in Figure 2,
we need to inject instruction feature “or [rax],ebp” into the
target binary. Since NDISASM disassembles every bytes in
the binary, we can add a new non-loadable section to store
the bytes of the corresponding instruction. This simple in-
jecting strategy causes NDISASM to extract this feature and
does not change the functionality of the program.
The second example shows the case where we can sim-
ply remove a feature, without replacing the removed pro-
gram property with a semantically equivalent one. As shown
in Figure 3, this feature seems to represent an imul instruc-
tion. However, offset 0x3e09 of the binary is in the .strtab
section, which stores symbol names for the compile-time
symbol table. Therefore, instead of representing an instruc-
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Binary name 1835486 1481492 paladin8
Feature string imul ebp,[fs:rsi+hexadecimal],
dword hexadecimal
Offset in the binary 0x3e09
Raw bytes 64 69 6E 38 2E 63 70 70
Modification Overwrite bytes to other values
Figure 3: An example of removing a NDISASM feature. This
feature seems to represent an instruction, but actually represents a
string in the .strtab section.
tion, the feature represents string “in8.cpp”. To remove this
feature, We can change the string “in8.cpp” to any another
string. .strtab is used at debug-time, and not used at the
link-time or run-time (it disappears if the binary is stripped),
so changing its content does not impact the functionality of
the original program.
In addition, we tried to understand why the
string “in8.cpp” is a useful feature. We found
that the string is extracted from source file name
“1835486 1481492 paladin8.cpp” and “paladin8” is
the author’s name. So, this feature turns out to contain three
characters of the author’s name. While a string containing
three characters of the author’s name is useful for identifying
the author, such author name feature is not available in any
realistic context. This example teaches us a lesson that
machine learning practitioners need to ensure that the
feature definition and the extracted features actually match.
In this case, instruction features should only be extracted
from real code bytes. So, the use of NDISASM is not robust
for real world identification because it disassembles all bytes
in the binary.
2.3.2 Modifying radare2 Features
We now show two examples of modifying radare2 features.
The first example shows the case where we need to insert
new code and data. As shown in Figure 4, feature “num-
ber.in” represents a string. Note that this feature is not
present in the target binary, and we need to inject it into
the target binary to cause misprediction. We found feature
“number.in” in another binary, based on the instruction “mov
$0x400c57,%edi”. Here, address 0x400c57 points to a string
“number.in”; radare2 recognizes the string and prints it in the
disassembly results.
To inject this feature, we need to (1) insert string “num-
ber.in” into the target binary, and (2) insert a mov instruction
that loads the address of the inserted string. However, to trick
radare2 to disassemble the inserted instruction, there are two
additional steps. First, we create a function symbol pointing
to the inserted code. Second, we append a return instruction
after the inserted code. Since most binary analysis tools treat
function symbols as ground truth for specifying the locations
of code bytes, our injection strategies can be also applied to
Feature string number.in
Machine instruction mov $0x400c57,%edi
1. Insert string “number.in” into a new
data section
Modifications
2. Insert new instructions to load the
inserted string
Figure 4: An example of injecting a radare2 feature. This fea-
ture represents a string. We need to insert the string and insert an
instruction to load the address of the string.
Feature string obj.stdin
Machine instruction mov 0x20157d(%rip),%rax
1. Load 0x20157d(%rip)-1 into %rax
Modifications
2. Increment %rax
Figure 5: An example of removing a radare2 feature. This fea-
ture represents an object symbol. We can split the address loading
instruction into two instructions to remove the feature.
other binary analysis tools.
The second example shows the case where we need to re-
place existing code with semantically equivalent code to re-
move a feature. As shown in Figure 5, we need to remove
a feature describing an object symbol. The feature is ex-
tracted from instruction “mov 0x20157d(%rip),%rax”. Here
radare2 recognizes that the result of the PC-relative calcula-
tion points to an object symbol, so it annotates the instruc-
tion with the name of the object symbol in the disassembly
results.
To remove this feature, we need to transform the calcula-
tion of the symbol address to a semantically equivalent calcu-
lation done by one or more instructions, so that radare2 can-
not recognize the loading of the symbol address. To do this,
we can split the address loading into two instructions: load-
ing the address minus one into the target register and incre-
menting the target register by one. We cannot just overwrite
the symbol name with a different string because this symbol
is in the .dynsym section and it is used for dynamic linking
(Overwriting the name of a dynamic symbol will cause the
program to not be loadable).
3 Attack Framework
We describe our attack framework in this section, based on
the attack algorithm in Figure 6. The inputs to our algo-
rithm includes an input binary b, a target classifier m, feature
groups f g, and a misprediction target label tar. The output
of the algorithm is an adversarial binary b′ that causes the re-
quired misprediction. The main component of our algorithm
is an attack-verify loop, where we iterate over feature groups
until we generate a new binary that causes misprediction.
Our algorithm relies on two routines from the machine
learning application we are attacking: FeatureExtraction
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input : an input binary b; a pre-trained model m;
feature groups f g; and a misprediction target
tar (tar =−1 represents untargeted attacks)
output: an adversarial binary b′ that causes
misprediction
1 P← FeatureCorrelationAnalysis(m);
2 x← FeatureExtraction(b);
3 y← Prediction(m, x);
// Keep looping until causing misprediction
4 for g in f g do
5 x′ ← FeatureVectorModification(x, g, P);
6 b′← InputBinaryModification(b, x′ , g, P);
7 y← Prediction(m, FeatureExtraction(b′));
// Non-targeted attacks succeed
8 if tar ==−1 and y 6= y′ then break;
// Targeted attacks succeed
9 if tar 6=−1 and tar == y′ then break;
Figure 6: The attack algorithm. The main structure of the al-
gorithm is to iterate over feature groups until we generate a new
binary that causes misprediction.
to extract features and Prediction to generate a prediction
label from a set of known labels. The meaning of these la-
bels depend on the target application. For example, a label
can describe an author for authorship attribution or a com-
piler for compiler identification. We now describe the other
routines in our algorithm.
3.1 Feature Correlation Analysis
Given a set of features F = { f1, f2, . . . , fk} used in the tar-
get classifier m, our feature correlation analysis generates a
partitioning of the features, P= {p1, p2, . . . , pk}, where each
partition consists of all correlated features. So, ∀ fx ∈ pi and
fy ∈ pi, fx and fy are correlated; and ∀i 6= j, fx ∈ pi, and
fy ∈ p j, fx and fy are not correlated. In addition, feature
partitions are disjoint. So, ∀i 6= j, pi∩ p j = /0.
We build a undirected graph to generate the feature parti-
tioning. Let G = (V,E), where each node in the graph repre-
sents a feature (so V = F), and each edge in the graph repre-
sents the correlation between two features. We only capture
linear correlation between features, creating an edge between
two nodes if the linear correlation coefficient between two
features is larger than a pre-specified threshold. In another
words, E = {( fi, f j) : coei j ≥ T}, where coei j is the linear
correlation coefficient between fi and f j and T is the pre-
specified threshold. Finally, each connected component in
the graph represents a partition of the correlated features.
An important observation is that we do not have to capture
the exact correlation between features to launch successful
attacks. For example, suppose we have three features: “ f1:
push rax; push rbx”, “ f2: push rax”, and “ f3: push rbx”. The
precise correlation is
( f req( f1)≤ f req( f2))∧ ( f req( f1)≤ f req( f3)) (1)
where f req( f ) represents the frequency of feature f . Our
algorithm will put all three features in the same partition and
derive the following correlation:
f req( f2) = A1 f req( f1)+B1, f req( f3) = A2 f req( f1)+B2
(2)
As we will discuss in the next section, it is straightforward
to incorporate correlation (2) into our feature vector modifi-
cation. In addition, as the linear correlation is derived from a
data set drawn from the same domain as the training set for
the target classifier, feature vectors satisfying correlation (2)
typically also satisfy correlation (1).
3.2 Feature Vector Modification
Given an input feature vector x = [x1,x2, . . . ,xk], where xi
represents the feature value of feature fi, our feature vector
modification outputs a modified feature vector x′ , such that
the prediction results for x′ are different from the prediction
results of x (for untargeted attacks) or are the specified results
(for targeted attacks).
Our attack framework supports multiple strategies for gen-
erating the required feature vector, including random modi-
fication, the attack presented by Carlini and Wagner [7] (de-
noted as the CW attack), and the projected gradient descent
(PGD). The basic idea of these strategies is to define x′ as
x + δ ; so once we have calculated δ , we know x′ . They
differ in terms of how to calculate δ . Adversarial learning
based strategies such as the CW attack convert the calcula-
tion of δ into numerical optimization problems and utilize
general purpose optimizer such as Adam [13].
We make three modifications to the CW attack and the
PGD attack when applying them to our domain. First, they
may generate feature vectors with non-integer values. How-
ever, as discussed in Section 2.1, Caliskan-Islam et al. [6]
used feature counts to construct feature vectors. So, x′
should only have integer values. A simple strategy that
works well for us is to round values generated by the CW
attack to the nearest integer.
Second, we must incorporate the feature correlation infor-
mation derived in Section 3.1 into the attack. To do this,
we normalize each individual feature to a Gaussian with
zero mean and unit variance, merge all correlated features
into one feature, and let the CW attacks work with only
the merged features. Recall that we track linear correla-
tion between features; for two correlated features f1 and f2,
f req( f1) = A f req( f2)+B. After the normalization step, A
is normalized to 1 and B is normalized to 0. Therefore, we
can merge them into a single feature.
7
Third, we found that existing attacks often did not gener-
ate an adversarial feature vectors with the minimal number of
modified features. So, we design a two-step post-processing
to further reduce the number of modified features and the
magnitude of changes. First, for each modified feature, we
undo the modification and set its value to its unmodified
value. If we can still cause misprediction, we finalize the
undo of the modification. Second, for each modified feature,
we enumerate every integer between the unmodified value
and the new value. We set the value of this feature to the one
that is closest to the unmodified value and causes mispredic-
tion.
3.3 Binary modification strategies
Given a new feature vector x′ that causes misprediction, we
describe how to modify the input binary to match x′ , group-
ing features based on the program properties that the features
describe and the binary analysis tool used to extract the fea-
ture. We also describe feature injection and removal strate-
gies for feature groups. Our modification strategies consist
of binary modification primitives supported by tools such as
Dyninst [22]. Finally, we discuss how to determine which
modification strategy to use for a specified feature and how
to generate diverse adversarial binaries.
3.3.1 Feature injection strategies
Table 1 summarizes our feature injection strategies. The first
column lists the program properties we are going to inject,
including machine instructions and loading the address of a
symbol or data. The second and third columns list the mod-
ification primitives needed to inject features that can be ex-
tracted by NDISASM and radare2. A cell with “NA” means
that the binary analysis tool cannot extract the program prop-
erty. We discuss the non-NA cells in more details:
• Instructions extracted by NDISASM: The modification
primitive InsertNonCodeBytes(I) creates a new non-
loadable section in the binary to store the bytes repre-
senting new instructions. As NDISASM disassembles
all bytes in the target binary, InsertNonCodeBytes(I)
ensures that the features are injected and the function-
ality is unchanged.
• Machine instructions extracted by radare2: The mod-
ification primitive InsertFunction(I) creates a new
function in which we store the inserted instructions.
To ensure that radare2 disassembles the inserted code,
InsertFunction(I) creates a new code section to store
the inserted instructions, appends a return instruction at
the end, and create a new function symbol to point to
the inserted instructions.
• Loading symbol S: The modification primitive
InsertSymbol(S) inserts the symbol S into the target
binary and returns the address pointing to the symbol.
It is important to properly fill in all fields of the symbol
in the symbol table, including symbol type, symbol
visibility, and symbol section index. Binary analysis
tools may ignore incomplete symbols, causing the
injection to fail. We then use InsertFunction(I) to
insert code that loads the address of the new symbol.
• Loading data D: The modification primitive
InsertData(D) inserts the specified data into the
target binary. We typically need to create a new
data section to hold the injected data. Then, we use
InsertFunction(I) to insert code that loads the data.
• Calling function F: The modification primitive
InsertCall(F) inserts the specified function F into
the target binary, where F can be a function from an
external library. In such case, we also need to add
information for dynamic linking into the target binary,
including a dynamic function symbol, a relocation en-
try, and a procedural linkage stub (PLT) for performing
the external call. Then, we use InsertFunction(I) to
insert code that calls F .
3.3.2 Feature removal strategies
Table 2 summarizes our feature removal strategies. The first
column lists the program properties we are going to remove
or replace. The second and third columns list the binary
modification primitives needed for removing a feature group:
• Instructions I from debug-time sections: The modifi-
cation primitive Overwrite(I) overwrites the target in-
struction bytes to other bytes. This strategy does not
change the program’s functionality as debug-time sec-
tions are not used at link-time or run-time.
• Instructions I from code sections: We design two strate-
gies for this feature group. The modification primitive
Swap(I) checks the operand dependencies and reorders
the instructions if there is no dependency. The modifi-
cation primitive InsertNop(I) inserts a nop instruction
between the original instructions. Note that to insert a
nop instruction, we may need to relocate the original
instructions to a different location to create extra space
for the nop. Therefore, we prefer Swap over InsertNop
if possible.
• Addressing loading of S: The modification primitive
SplitAddrLoad(S) splits the address loading instruc-
tion into two instructions so that radare2 will not rec-
ognize the address loading. We use the following two
instructions: loading the address minus one into the tar-
get register and incrementing the target register.
• Function call to S: The modification primitive
ConvToIndCall(S) converts a function call to S to an in-
direct (pointer-based) function call, so that radare2 will
not recognize the call target. ConvToIndCall(S) uses
SplitAddrLoad(S) to load the function call target and
then generates an indirect call. Note that we need to
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Table 1: Summary of feature injection strategies. The first column lists the program properties to inject. The second and third columns
list the binary modification primitives used for the injection.
Program Property NDISASM radare2
Instructions I InsertNonCodeBytes(I) InsertFunction(I)
Loading symbol S NA
addr = InsertSymbol(S)
InsertFunction(loading addr)
Loading data D NA
addr = InsertData(D)
InsertFunction(loading addr)
Calling function F NA
addr = InsertCall(F)
InsertFunction(calling addr)
Table 2: Summary of feature removal strategies. The first col-
umn lists the program properties to remove or replace. The second
and third columns list the binary modification primitives for feature
removal.
Program Property NDISASM radare2
Instructions I from
debug sections
Overwrite(I) NA
Instructions I from
code sections
Swap(I) or InsertNop(I)
Addressing loading
of symbol S
NA SplitAddrLoad(S)
Addressing loading
of data D
NA SplitAddrLoad(D)
Function call to
function symbol S
NA ConvToIndCall(S)
save and restore the register used for performing the in-
direct call if it is live at this point in the code.
3.3.3 Deciding which strategy to apply
We have several criteria to determine which strategy to use
for a modified feature. Based on the sign of δi, we decide
whether we need to inject (see Table 1) or remove (see Ta-
ble 2) features. Based on the address where the feature was
extracted, we determine from which section the feature is ex-
tracted, including debug-time sections, code sections, or data
sections.
For features extracted from code sections, we determine
whether the feature describes a function call, loading a sym-
bol, or loading data. If none of the three cases applies,
the feature describes just instructions, and no other program
property needs to be modified.
3.3.4 Generating diverse adversarial binaries
Table 1 and Table 2 show one set of feasible modification
strategies to inject and remove features, out of a large space
for binary modification. Other modification strategies can be
designed to achieve the same goals of feature injection and
removal. We use two examples to show other possibilities
of binary modification. Attackers can add more modification
strategies to add diversity to the attack.
Use randomization: Several of our modification strate-
gies can incorporate randomization to generate diverse ad-
versarial binaries. Overwrite(I) overwrites the target in-
struction bytes to other bytes. Here, we can randomly gen-
erate the overwritten bytes. Similarly, SplitAddrLoad(S)
can split the address loading instruction into two instructions
with randomization: loading the address a randomly gener-
ate integer into the target register and incrementing the target
register with generated integer.
Generate semantically equivalent instructions: The
natural way to remove instruction features is to replace ex-
isting instructions with semantically equivalent instructions.
Superoptimizer fits our goal here [15], which takes machine
instructions as input, and outputs machine instructions that
compute the same functionality as the input. It is expensive
to perform superoptimization in a general case. However, as
we typically need to replace only short instruction sequences,
the search space would be relatively small. Therefore, super-
optimization is a promising method for generating semanti-
cally equivalent instructions.
4 Evaluations
We evaluate several aspects of our attacks: (1) whether we
can effectively perform untargeted attacks to evade author-
ship identification, (2) whether we can effectively perform
targeted attacks to impersonate someone else, (3) how effec-
tive are different feature vector modification strategies, in-
cluding random modification, the CW attack, and the PGD
attack, (4) which features are modified in our attacks and
which binary modification strategies are commonly used, (5)
whether our post-processing steps are effective for reducing
the number of modified features, and (6) why some of our
attacks failed. Our evaluations show that
• Our untargeted attacks are effective. We achieved 96%
success rate in our experiments, showing that we can
effectively suppress authorship signals.
• The success rate of our targeted attacks are 46% on av-
erage, showing that it is significantly more difficult to
impersonate someone else.
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• The key to effective feature modification is utilizing
feature correlation information. With feature correla-
tion information, even random modification can achieve
decent success rate for untargeted attacks. Not sur-
prisingly, adversarial learning based strategies such as
the CW attack perform significantly better than random
modification on untargeted attacks, and are necessary
for targeted attacks.
• The top modified features describe function calls. This
indicates that authorship identification classifiers heav-
ily rely on function calls to identify authors. Therefore,
inserting function calls that are associated with other
authors is an effectively way to cause misprediction.
• Without our post-processing, there are 80 features to
modify on average. With our post-processing, there are
only 10 features to modify on average. Therefore, our
post-processing procedure can significantly reduce the
number of changed features for launching a successful
attack.
• For failed untargeted attacks, the lack of strategies for
modifying CFG features and decompiled source fea-
tures is the reason for failure. For failed targeted at-
tacks, about a third of the cases are caused by lack of
modification strategies for CFG and decompiled source
features; the other two thirds of the cases failed because
the targeted CW attack cannot generate a feature vec-
tor that both corresponds to a real binary and causes the
required misprediction.
4.1 Evaluation Methodology
We evaluated our techniques by attacking classifiers trained
with the techniques presented by Caliskan-Islam et al. [6]
(described in Section 2.1). Our experiments consist of the
following steps:
1. Randomly sample K authors from the Google Code Jam
data set of around 1000 authors used by Caliskan-Islam
et al. [6]. This data set consists of the source code of
single-author programs, each with an author label.
2. Compile all the programs written by the sampled au-
thors with GCC 5.4.0 and -O0 optimization. Each au-
thor had an average of 8 binary programs.
3. Split the binaries into a training set and a testing set,
with a size ratio of about 7:1.
4. Train a random forest classifier with the training set.
5. Perform our attack on each binary in the testing set for
which the target classifier makes the correct prediction.
For each test binary, we perform one untargeted attack,
and K−1 targeted attacks. The targeted attacks attempt
to cause misprediction for each of the incorrect authors.
We varied K from 5 to 100 to investigate how the number
of training authors impact the effectiveness of our attacks.
For each value of K, we repeated the experiments five times
and report the averaged results. We used Scikit-learn [24] for
training random forest classifiers, Tensorflow [29] for train-
ing substitute classifiers, and Dyninst [22] for implementing
our binary modification strategies.
We implemented the CW attack, the PGD attack and two
versions of random modification for feature vector modifica-
tion. The two random strategies are rand, which randomly
modifies features without considering the feature correlation,
and rand-cor, which uses the feature correlation information
derived in Section 3.1. The CW attack and the PGD attack
are extended to use the feature correlation information. We
used the L0 version of the CW attack because it is designed to
minimize the number of modified features. In all our experi-
ments, we keep the features unmodified, for which we do not
have corresponding binary modification strategies. We use
rand as the baseline, rand-cor to investigate the importance
of feature correlation, and use the CW attack and the PGD
attack to investigate how much gain the adversarial learning
based strategies can provide.
In our experiments, the CW attack on average modifies 10
features and generates fewer than 200 feature vectors before
finding a desired feature vector. For fair comparison, rand
and rand-cor randomly choose 2 to 20 features to modify
and are allowed to repeat 5000 times to find a desired feature
vector.
We use success rate to measure the effectiveness of our
attacks, defined as
# o f success f ul attacks
# o f total attacks
(3)
An attack is successful if the binary generated by our at-
tack caused the target classifier to make an incorrect predic-
tion. For untargeted attacks, incorrect prediction means any
of the incorrect authors. For targeted attacks, incorrect pre-
diction means the specific targeted author. We measure the
combined success rate of all the implemented feature vec-
tor modification strategies and also their individual success
rates.
4.2 Evaluation Results
The first question to answer in our evaluation is how effec-
tive is our attack. The results are shown in Table 3. In this
table, the second and the third columns are the accuracy of
the target classifiers and the substitute classifiers. The fourth
and the fifth columns list the the combined success rate of
untargeted and targeted attacks. Our untargeted attack has a
96% success rate on average, showing that we can effectively
suppress authorship signal. However, our targeted attacks
did not enjoy the same success as the untargeted ones. Our
targeted attack has a 46% success rate on average, showing
that it is significantly more difficult to impersonate a specific
programmer’s style.
Table 3 also shows how the number of training authors
K impacts the effectiveness of our attacks. For untargeted
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Table 3: Evaluation results. The second and the third columns list the accuracy of the target classifiers and the substitute classifiers. The
fourth and the fifth columns show the combined success rate for untargeted and targeted attacks.
K
Target classifier
accuracy
Substitute classifier
accuracy
Untargeted attack
success rate
Targeted attack
success rate
5 100% 100% 88% 88%
15 100% 80% 93% 51%
30 89% 73% 98% 47%
50 86% 69% 100% 31%
100 82% 68% 100% 14%
Average 91% 78% 96% 46%
attacks, our success rate increases as K increases. Untargeted
attacks only need to cause misprediction against any of the
K−1 incorrect authors. The larger the K, the more incorrect
authors our attacks can work with, and the higher the success
rate. For targeted attacks, our success rate decreases as K
increases. Targeted attacks must cause misprediction against
a specific target author. The larger the K, the more non-target
authors our target attack must avoid, and the more difficult
the targeted attack.
The accuracy gap between the target classifier and the sub-
stitute classifier does not obviously impact the success rate
of our attack. As shown in Table 3, The accuracy gap ranges
from 0% to 20%. The success rates of both untargeted and
targeted attacks do not exhibit an obvious correlation with
the accuracy gap.
We then investigate the effectiveness of each feature vec-
tor modification strategies. Figure 7 shows the results for
untargeted attacks. The baseline rand did not perform well
because many generated feature vectors violates the fea-
ture correlation and thus do not correspond to real binaries.
rand-cor performed much better than rand, showing that it
is crucial to capture feature correlation. The CW and the
PGD attacks performed the best, showing that adversarial
learning based strategies are effective for exploring the large
feature space to find required feature vectors.
Figure 8 shows the results for targeted attacks. Random-
ization based strategies have little success in targeted attacks,
showing that adversarial learning based techniques are nec-
essary for targeted attacks. The PGD attack is designed for
only untargeted attack, so we did not include it in this exper-
iment.
We then investigate what are the commonly used binary
modification strategies and what are the commonly modi-
fied features. In Table 4, we list the number of times that a
modification primitive is used in our untargeted attacks for
K = 30. The most frequently used primitive is InsertCall,
indicating that the target classifiers heavily rely on function
call features to identify authors. So, inserting function calls
that are associated with other authors is an effectively way to
cause misprediction. SplitAddrLoad ranks second, showing
that the target classifiers also rely on features that describe
the loading of a symbol to identify authors. InsertFunction
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Figure 7: Comparison of feature vector modification strategies
for untargeted attacks The x-axis is the number of training au-
thors. The y-axis is the success rate.
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Figure 8: Comparison of feature vector modification strategies
for targeted attacks The x-axis is the number of training authors.
The y-axis is the success rate.
11
Table 4: Number of times that a binary modification primitive
is used in untargeted attacks. The numbers are from the attacks
for 30 training authors (K = 30). The rows are sorted in a decreas-
ing order.
Modification primitive Times used
InsertCall 586
SplitAddrLoad 292
InsertFunction 196
Swap & InsertNop 193
ConvToIndCall 115
InsertNonCodeByte 102
Overwrite 85
InsertData 68
InsertSymbol 45
Table 5: The number of feature changed by our untargeted
attacks. The second column lists the average number of features
changed by the L0 CW attack. The third column shows the average
number of features changed after our post-processing.
K L0 CW attack Our post-processing
5 57 9
15 107 11
30 87 11
50 59 9
100 92 11
Average 80 10
ranks third, showing that inserting instructions that are typi-
cally seen in programs written by other authors is also effec-
tive for causing misprediction. Swap and InsertNop serve the
purpose of removing instruction features. These two primi-
tives have an effectiveness similar to InsertFunction, in-
dicating that removing distinct instruction sequences asso-
ciated with an author is effective for causing misprediction.
Other strategies including editing debug sections, inserting
data, and inserting symbols, all play important roles in our
attacks.
Next, we investigate how many features we need to change
to cause misprediction. In Table 5, the second column shows
the number of changed features generated by the untargeted
L0 CW attack, and the third column shows the number of
changed features after our post-processing step. Before post-
processing, there are 80 features to modify on average. Af-
ter the post-processing, there are only 10 features to modify
on average. Our results show that our post-processing proce-
dure can significantly reduce the number of changed features
for performing a successful attack.
4.3 Analysis of Failed Attacks
Our attack contains two key steps: feature vector modifica-
tion to generate a vector that both corresponds to a real bi-
nary and causes the required misprediction, and input binary
modification to generate a new binary that matches the ad-
versarial feature vector. A failure in either of the two steps
would lead to a failed attack. Feature vector modification
fails when it cannot find such an adversarial feature vector
that corresponds to a real binary and causes the required mis-
prediction. Input binary modification fails when it does not
generate a new binary that causes the required misprediction.
We found that feature vector modification accounts for all the
failed attacks.
We break down the reasons of why our feature vector mod-
ification step would fail to generate an adversarial feature
vector. Recall that our feature vector modification includes
randomization, the CW attack, and the PGD attack. These
modification strategies do not consider whether the gener-
ated vector would correspond to a real binary. We adapted
them in three ways to generate vectors that correspond to a
real binary. First, as we implemented binary modification
strategies for only instruction features, the CFG features and
decompiled source code features are not modified during fea-
ture vector modification. Second, as the value of an instruc-
tion feature represents the number of times that this feature
appears in a binary, the feature value is an integer. How-
ever, the CW attack and the PGD attack do not guarantee to
generate integer values. So, we round the results of the CW
attacks to the nearest integer values. Third, we capture fea-
ture correlation and merge correlated features. We can then
divide failed feature vector modification into two categories:
Lack of modification strategies for CFG and decompiled
source features: It may not be sufficient to modify
only instruction features to evade authorship iden-
tification. Failed attacks in this category need bi-
nary modification strategies for CFG and decom-
piled source features.
Insufficient handling of finding feature vectors corre-
sponding to real binaries: Our techniques for gen-
erating feature vectors that correspond to real bi-
naries need further improvement. For example,
we currently capture only linear correlation be-
tween features.
We found that all the failed untargeted attacks were due
to not being able to modify CFG or decompiled source fea-
tures. For failed targeted attacks, not being able to modify
CFG or decompiled source features explained about 34% of
the failed cases; not being able to find a feature vector that
corresponds to a real binary explained the other failed cases.
Our analysis shows that to improve untargeted attacks, we
need to continue to design new modification strategies for
CFG and decompiled source features. To improve targeted
attacks, we also need to improve the targeted CW attack to
find feature vectors that correspond to real binaries.
While our binary modification strategies were able to
match all modified features, We found that they sometimes
caused side effects and changed features that should not have
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been changed. Fortunately, such side effects did not impact
the prediction results. The number of unintended changes
ranged from 0 to 20. Most of the unintended changes were
made to NDISASM instruction features. This is because
our feature injection strategies often insert new code and
data sections, which in turn requires changes to the program
header of the binary. As NIDSASM disassembles all the
bytes in the binary, the changes in the program header would
cause unintended changes to NDISASM instruction features.
It is not surprising that such unintended changes did not im-
pact the prediction results as the program header is unlikely
to carry authorship signals.
In summary, the our evaluations show that our attack
framework is effective for untargeted attacks and we can
practically suppress authorship signals. Performing targeted
attacks is significantly more difficult than untargeted at-
tacks. Our results also reveal weaknesses in current author-
ship identification techniques. Many features used in cur-
rent authorship identification techniques are based on pro-
gram properties that are easy to fabricate, such as function
calls and symbols. We have shown that we can automatically
modify these features, making such classifiers vulnerable to
test time attacks.
5 Discussion and Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first project to per-
form binary code authorship evasion. In this section, we
place our work in a broader context and discuss several re-
lated research areas.
Stealthy binary rewriting: Stealthiness is an important
goal of out attack. We observed that the generated binaries
show distinct characteristics such as the presence of addi-
tional code sections and springboard jump instructions from
original code sections to newly added code sections. These
distinct characteristics are introduced by Dyninst and ev-
ery binary modified by Dyninst exhibits such characteristics.
Since Dyninst is also widely used in many benign applica-
tions, such as binary hardening techniques [23, 31, 32]. The
presence of Dyninst footprints does not necessarily indicate
the presence of tamperers.
We are aware of other binary rewriting techniques, such
as reassembly [33, 34]. Reassembly disassembles the binary
and creates artificial symbols for data and code references.
Binary rewriting is performed by first modifying the assem-
bly code and then re-assembling the code. Reassembly has
the advantage that code can be injected or removed in place,
thus providing better stealthiness.
We chose to use Dyninst for binary rewriting as it is a
mature and widely used tool. We leave the exploration of
using reassembly for binary rewriting as future work.
Adversarial learning on malware detection: While our
work is not directly targeted to malware detection, we believe
our techniques can contribute to this field in two ways.
First, a common threat model of adversarial learning on
malware detection assumes that attackers can only inject fea-
tures and cannot remove features. Monotonic classification
[11] ensures that an adversary will not be able to evade the
classifier by adding more features. Our results show that we
can effectively remove features, challenging the validity of
their threat model.
Second, existing techniques for adversarial learning on
malware detection have focused on generating adversarial
feature vectors to cause misprediction, but have not focused
on generating new binaries that match their feature vectors.
We show that it is possible to perform end-to-end attack by
generating new binaries.
Evading source code authorship: Simko et al. [26] per-
formed a study of evading source code single-author identifi-
cation. 28 programmers participated in their study, including
undergrad students, former or current software developers.
Each programmer was given code from author X and Y and
then was asked to modify source code written by X to look
like code written by Y. Essentially, the study performed man-
ual attacks.
Simko et al. found that effective source code changes are
mostly local, involving a few lines of code For example, it
is effective to copy entire lines of code written by Y into
code written by X, modify variables names, add or remove
macors, and change newlines and spaces between operators.
The modification strategies presented in this study are un-
likely to achieve equal success for evading binary code au-
thorship identification, as many of the modifications are irrel-
evant at the binary code level, such as typographic changes,
variables renaming, and modifying macros.
6 Conclusion
We have presented our attack framework for performing
authorship evasion. Our attack framework includes com-
ponents for analyzing feature correlation, generating fea-
ture vectors to cause misprediction, and binary modification
strategies to match the generated feature vectors. Our evalu-
ations have shown that our attack framework is effective for
untargeted attacks, which is to cause misprediction to any of
the incorrect authors. Targeted attacks are significantly more
difficult to achieve, which is to cause misprediction to a spe-
cific one among the incorrect authors.
Our attack experiences show that it is not secure to rely
on features derived from program properties that are easy
to modify, such as function calls, symbols, data, and instruc-
tions. Authorship identification techniques must consider the
trustworthiness of the features.
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